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TAMÁS SÁNDOR*  
 
Take-Over Legislation in Hungary 
 
 
Abstract. In the first part of the paper, the author provides an extensive analysis of the 
take-over regulation of 1997, the first of this kind in Hungarian law. The author examines 
the relationship of take-over and antitrust law pointing out the ambiguities of the 
regulation of 1997. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the recent Hungarian 
take-over regulation of 2001, containing more strict and detailed rules at the same time 
increasing the regulative competence of the government agencies considerably. The paper 
concludes on a note of doubt concerning the reasonableness of such an powerful extension 
of state regulation.  
 The relationship between the rules of company law and securities law governing the 
acquisition of shares of Hungarian public companies is an important problem of legal 
dogmatics. Since the acquisition of shares is an issue essentially governed by company 
law, the decision of the legislator both in 1997 and in 2001 to include the rules concerning 
take-over into securities law (thus rigidly separating them from the rules of company law) 
must be considered unreasonable. 
 It is argued that the fundamental problematic of the new regulation is that the 
purport and the signification of the take-over legislation receded in the process of recent 
legislation to give way to the prevalent and unjustifiably omnipotent requirements of 
rigour and „restoration of order“. The author, however, admits that the Hungarian 
legislation has adopted rules very similar to other European jurisdictions.  
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Take-over legislation is a comparatively recent development in Hungarian 
law. Until the mid-1990s the issue of take-over legislation had not been 
assigned particular importance, however, with the increasing significance of 
the stock exchange and, consequently, of public companies limited by shares 
(hereinafter referred to as companies), it gained momentum in Hungarian law. 
As a result, in parallel with framing of the new Act on Business Associations 
(hereinafter referred to as Companies Act), the first law, which considered 
the principles of the European Union Directive 13, under elaboration and 
discussion at the time and rejected in the middle of 2001, was drafted. Law 
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enforcement, apart from some relevant litigation cases, practically did not 
take place. At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, however, the 
issue overrode the professional scope and was given publicity in connection 
with the case of Borsodchem Co. Ltd., as further in the paper I will revert back 
to that.1 The case also delivered a number of lessons and revealed problems 
of legislation and law enforcement, besides, undoubtedly, boosting the 
process of the revision of regulations in the relevant field. 
 
 
I. The Regulation of 1997 
 
1. Primarily, it is the notion itself that should be clarified. In terms of 
take-overs, an “enterprise” is construed as a business association, a public 
company. Take-overs do not cover either the acquisition of shares of a private 
company or of a stake in a limited liability company, even if the respective 
transaction results in a one-person company. That could imply an issue in 
antitrust law (see definition below), but does not pose a problem of take-
over legislation. Although the effect of the regulation of 1997 was not 
confined to quoted companies, it explicitly covered public companies, the 
majority of which are quoted at the stock exchange, however, in principle, 
public operation is not necessarily subject to official quotation at the 
stock exchange.  
 A further notional element consists in the proportion of shares to be 
acquired, which has been limited at a rate of 33 per cent under 1997 statutes, 
and as I will point out, this rate didn’t change under 2001 regulations, apart 
from relevant exceptions.  
 Before revising the underlying principles of the 1997 regulation, I will 
look into the question whether and why the specific regulation is necessary, 
i.e., in what way the regulation of “take-over” relates to the regulation of 
the so-called acquisition of control, commonly known as antitrust law on 
the one hand, and competition law on the other hand.  
 Concerning competition law, the crucial issue from the point of view 
of take-over and antitrust legislation to be highlighted is that neither 
antitrust law, nor take-over legislation can aim at gratuitous prevention of 
acquisitions of company stakes. The objective of state regulation, however, 
and Hungary is not peculiar in that respect, is the sustention of control 
over and transparency of corporate structure and the acquisition of stakes. 

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 See below in Part 1.4. 
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Antitrust regulation has limited justifiability in case of private enterprises, 
which therefore remain relatively irrelevant to the following exposition. 
 The primary and substantive role of the (antitrust) regulation of 
acquisition of control consists in the protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests in associations, which poses a complex and manifold problem. 
Thereby, certain facilities that make information on acquisitions of various 
proportions accessible for minority shareholders are legally guaranteed. 
That objective of publicity in antitrust law is specified under Paras. (1) 
and (2) of Art. 292 of Companies Act on notification liability, the neglect 
of which is sanctioned by the reduction of voting rights. The facts of 
control acquisition (significant holdings over 25 p.c., majority holdings over 
50 p.c., and direct controlling interests over 75 p.c.) are stated in the 
framework of the Companies Act as ideal models of the way voting rates 
and the decision-making mechanisms are related in the association. A 
further legal instrument is provided by granting minority shareholders the 
right to sell their shares under given conditions on the one hand,2 or 
exercise specific minority rights if they retain their membership in the 
association, on the other hand.3 These legal instruments are supplemented 
by guaranteed protection for creditors, which gained momentum under 
Para. (3) of Art. 292 and Art. 296 of Companies Act. According to the 
principle of shifting responsibility, the provisions concerning the protection 
of creditors establish the direct responsibility of the acquirer under given 
conditions.  
 With respect to the above mentioned facts, the limit of 33 p.c. specified 
under the take-over regulation of 1997 does not seem justifiable in the first 
approach, which, however, reveals the implementation of a distinctively 
different legislative purpose and the application of according instruments. 
As a matter of fact, the purpose of antitrust regulations is that minority 
shareholders and creditors of the association are notified about the acquisition 
of a specific proportion of shares, so that according decisions could be made 
in the event of the acquisition of majority holdings or direct controlling 
interest. Being aware of the acquisition, minority shareholders may opt for 
selling their shares to the acquirer. Pursuant to creditor protection, however, 
minority shareholders may also determine the scope of operation of the 
acquired control, i.e. the limits beyond which the principle of company law, 
stipulating that members are not held responsible for debts in specified 
forms of associations, is ineffective. On the grounds of take-over statutes (as 

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 See Act CXLIV of 1997, Para. (1) of Art. 295 of Companies Act. 
 
3
 Para. (3) of Art. 295 of Companies Act. 
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expounded below), the buyer is obliged to make a public offer to the share-
holders of the association for their shares.4 The public offer shall be 
implemented in a manner and on condition that both the association and, 
although that aspect is usually not referred to, its management are protected, 
whereas elements of creditor protection are completely neglected by take-
over regulation. The consideration of the aspect of creditor protection points 
to basic differences between antitrust law, which also covers transactions 
following the acquisition of shares, on the one hand, and the 1997 regulation, 
which confines the scope of take-over regulation to the transaction of the 
public offer, the completion of which concludes the case from the legal 
point of view, on the other hand.  
 With regards to the underlying causes of take-over regulation, the most 
frequently mentioned factor is the publicity of the company. The operation 
both in case of a quoted and a non-quoted public company presupposes a 
wide scope of holders and the consequent fragmentation of company stock, 
which, furthermore, implies the potential control of the company owing to a 
relatively minor share. Of course, what is at stake is the assertion of the 
level, so as the regulation should not impede, restrain or prevent transfer of 
shares, which would contradict the structure and the role of a company 
limited by shares. The optimal solution is taking a middle course, which 
shall facilitate the achievement of goals favoured from the viewpoint of 
legal policy without hindering free movement of capital or the realisation 
of investments. The problem is not specific to Hungarian law, all countries 
that intend to settle the problem encounter this specific regulatory dilemma.  
 Another problem is the relationship of take-over regulation to competition 
law. While antitrust law, as mentioned above, seeks to protect minority 
shareholders’ rights and creditors’ interests, competition law purports to 
maintain fairness of business and competition. Take-over regulation, however, 
concerns both fields, when, on the one hand, it protects minority shareholders, 
on the other hand, applies its own legal instruments to protect companies 
and prevent cases that present so-called hostile take-overs, which is a function 
similar to that of competition law.  
 
2. In retrospect, the exposition of the development of take-over legislation 
in Hungary will also focus on the relationship of company law to securities 
law. The fact that Act VI of 1988, i.e. the first Act on Business Associations, 
avoided the definition of that relationship is down to several reasons, 

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 See Part 1.7. below, on the potential collision of rules concerning acquisition 
of control and take-over.  
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primarily, that at the time of making the law, companies limited by shares 
were not considered as a major field subject to company law. Although, 
companies limited by shares were established at the time, the majority 
sprang up as the outcome of the transformation of large state-owned 
companies and the number of owners was comparably limited even after 
privatisation. Furthermore, the operation of these companies was private, 
whereas the first Companies Act confined the terminological distinction of 
public and private formally to the foundation of the company, thereby 
constructed public operation as the principal case and misinterpreted both 
the situation and the foreseeable trends. The 1988 regulation also limited the 
scope of antitrust statutes, by providing for legal proceedings exclusively 
in the event of acquisition of control of a Hungarian company limited by 
shares by another Hungarian company limited by shares.5 Such regulation, 
however, was unreasonable in 1988 and the following years in view of the 
situation in Hungary. 
 Accordingly, the first Act on Securities (hereinafter referred to as A.S.) 
didn’t cover take-overs, nor did Act VI of 1990, although it provided for 
publicising securities and shares. The take-over issue was accentuated as a 
consequence of the development of European legislation on the one hand, 
and the change of Hungarian circumstances in the second half of the 
1990s on the other hand.  
 The Companies Act of 1997, as it is known, revised the regulation of 
companies limited by shares substantively, and instituted profound changes in 
the field of antitrust law by significantly extending its personal effect. The 
relationship between the law on shares and law on securities, however, 
remained unsolved or became even more problematic. Unexpectedly, with 
reference to alleged or real interests of legal policy, the law on securities 
preceded the Companies Act under elaboration, and provided for several 
issues, in an objectionable way, which would be subject to the regulation 
of shareholders’ rights, i.e. the Companies Act.6 After Act CXI of 1996, 

 
5
 The Supreme Court made an attempt at an interpretation propter legem by the 
purported extention of the term of “companies limited by shares” to foreign “corporations” 
on the part of the acquirer, which as a concept could be construed logical, but could not be 
not inferred from the text of the law, therefore it confronted with the resistance of both 
theory and lower courts, expressed in e.g. one of the rulings of the Court of Budapest. 
 
6
 Considering the limited scope of this paper, without further exposition let me 
refer to the fact that the Companies Act bans the transformation of dematerialised 
shares into printed shares under Para. (7) of Art. 22 of A.S., while it practically 
disallowed the establishment of public companies, and prescribed the transformation 
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i.e. the Act on Securities, had taken effect on 1st January, 1997, the makers of 
the Companies Act were confronted with a fait accompli and the primacy 
of securities law was unquestionable in the codification process of company 
law. Another implication was that the passing of the Companies Act made 
amendments to A.S. necessary, since take-over regulation was contained 
by the latter (see Arts 94–94/H of A.S.), whereas doctrinal, structural and 
substantive considerations would have justified its integration into the 
regulation of shareholders’ rights, i.e. the Companies Act.7 
 
3. The basic principle prescribed under Art. 180 of Companies Act, con-
cerning both bearer and registered shares, is that shares are freely trans-
ferable. Which fully complies with the principle that a company limited by 
shares is an explicitly capital-based, not a person-based form of association 
and, motivated by the aspect of mobility, securities as the exclusive form of 
association representing membership rights shall be issued to members. 
Notwithstanding, the Companies Act contains restrictive provisions. Art. 200 
provides for pre-emptive, repurchase and purchase rights and purchase obli-
gations concerning shares, Art. 201 specifies that the memoranda of private 
companies may confine the scope of transferable shares and categories of 
shares to specific persons, while Art. 202 allows for protection from 
hostile take-overs of private companies. According to a comparative 
analysis of the rule of the Companies Act and A.S., the transfer of public 
company shares under Art. 180 of Companies Act is feasible exclusively 
under the regulation of A.S. Which implies that the acquisition of shares 
under the limit of 33 p.c. is circumscribed under the Companies Act, 
however, the acquisition of shares surpassing that limit as specified by 
A.S. shall comply with the regulation of A.S. Under Para. (3) of Art. 94/H 
of A.S. of 1997, the violation of these rules incurred the nullity of the 
transfer of shares.  
 The regulation was provided under Para. (1) of Art. 94 of A.S., which 
made the acquisition through direct or indirect transfer of voting shares of 
                                                                                                                                               
of bearer’s shares into registered shares in case of private companies under Para. 3 of 
Art. 231 of A.S. 
 
7
 According to judgement of the author of that article, this proposition is still 
valid. Since issues of the conditions of share transfer are covered under the 
regulation of 2001, it should have been integrated into the Companies Act. As far as 
the relationship between securities law and company law is concerned, the second 
part of this paper will point out that it has not changed, the amendments to the A.S. 
under Act L of 2001 and the new draft law on capital markets are close to ignoring 
the viewpoints of both the Companies Act and company law.  
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a public company in excess of 33 p.c. subject to public offering. The text 
definitely implied that the acquisition of non-voting preference shares was 
not a matter of consideration with respect to the limit of 33 p.c. The acquisition 
of shares, not pursuant to transfer, but other ways, e.g. inheritance, was not 
covered by A.S. According to the provision of Para. (2), the proportion of 
shares of a company in excess of 33 p.c. is subject to public offer, which 
shall cover a further proportion of 50 p.c. of voting shares and convertible 
bonds if the company issued any. In other words, according to the statute, 
the acquirer of 33 p.c. of the shares can expect to be liable to buy a proportion 
of 83 p.c. of the company shares in case the public offer is accepted. 
 The 1997 regulation included another crucial element, when it stated 
that making a public offer was mandatory only once, i.e. following the 
acquisition in excess of the limit of 33 p.c., since, according to the general 
rules of the Companies Act concerning the transfer of shares, the buyer, 
who later wished to increase the rate of control of 33 p.c., could do so 
without making a public offer. The rule was not stated expressis verbis 
under A.S., but, implicitly, the intention was obvious according to Para. 
(1) of Art. 94.8 On the other hand, since the application of take-over rules was 
person-based, if the first buyer wished to transfer the acquired proportion 
of shares in excess of 33 p.c. to another person, who thereby transgressed 
the limit of 33 p.c. through the respective transaction, the new buyer was 
liable to make a public offer.9 
  
4. The text of Para. (1) of Art. 94 of A.S. includes reference to the 
requirement of consideration of both direct and indirect transfer of shares 
upon the assertion of control, which exceeds the limit of 33 p.c. Para. (5) 
basically amended the previous rule by stating that shares indirectly held 
by the offerors need to be considered upon the calculation of the level of 
control as specified under Para. (1). That particular issue is worth thorough 
examination, since the existence or non-existence of indirect stock, at least 
formally, was a crucial point in the Borsodchem Co. Ltd., case referred to in 
the introductory part of the paper, furthermore, the formulation of the 
draft law left some room for improvement. Then again, the new regulation 
brought into effect in the summer of 2001 elaborates in detail on that point, 
making radical amendments, as further expounded in Part II.  

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 Commentary on the Companies Act includes an according statement, in: Tár-
sasági törvény, cégtörvény (Companies Act, Act on Firms) Sárközy, T., 2nd revised 
edition, Budapest, 2000, 569.  
 
9
 Commentary on the Companies Act, 570. 
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 I will start with the interpretation of the letters of the law. If, 
according to other conditions and the proportion of acquired shares, the 
necessity of making a public offer shall be asserted, i.e. whether the 
proportion was under or over the 33 p.c. limit, then the calculation shall 
concern not only the shares acquired directly by the respective person, but 
the shares acquired indirectly and those to be acquired and directly or 
indirectly in the future. The primary problem was posed by the fact that 
A.S. in this part didn’t define the term of direct acquisition of shares. 
Point 36 of Para. (2) of Art. 3 of A.S., however, provided a definition of 
the term of indirect interest under the interpretative provisions. Accordingly, 
indirect interest is constituted by a share of holding in an enterprise or a 
share of voting and holding rights of the original enterprise, or by the 
voting and holding rights of another enterprise, the calculation of which 
shall be made as specified under Appendix 4 of Act on Credit Institutions 
(hereinafter referred to as A.C.I.).10 Owing to the definition, the calculation 
of the indirect acquisition of shares, not circumscribed in A.S., became 
feasible. Appendix 4 of A.C.I., referred to under the passage “Calculation 
of indirect interest” in A.S., specifies the calculation method of the 
proportion of indirect interest as follows: the share of holding in the 
“intermediate enterprise” circumscribed under Point III/12 of Appendix 2 
of A.C.I. (defined as another enterprise in A.S.) shall be multiplied by the 
share of holding or voting rights of the intermediate enterprise in the 
original enterprise. With the following example, I will model the scheme 
above. If a person intends to acquire a share of 20 p.c. in a public company 
(i.e. original enterprise), whereas the given person owned a share of 50 
p.c. in an enterprise (i.e. intermediate enterprise), which held a share of 
30 p.c. in the original enterprise, according to the rules, that person will 
own an indirect share of 15 p.c.. That proportion shall be added to the 
direct share of 20 p.c., which makes up a total share of 35 p.c. Since the 
proportion of acquired shares surpasses the limit of 33 p.c. in that case, 
making a public offer is mandatory. 
 Appendix 4 of A.C.I., however, narrowed the scope of application of 
rules concerning the acquisition of indirect interest in two respects. It 
stipulated in one respect that the holding or voting rights under the rate of 
25 p.c. in the intermediate enterprise shall be ignored, in another respect, 
that a share of holding in an intermediate enterprise through more than 
one enterprise shall not be considered. As for the implications of these 
two rules applied to the example above, it follows that if the share of 

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 See, Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises.  
 TAKE-OVER LEGISLATION IN HUNGARY 99 
  
holding in the intermediate enterprise is only 20 p.c. instead of 50 p.c., it 
shall be ignored, even if the share of holding of the intermediate enterprise is 
higher than 30 p.c., for instance 50 p.c. The explanation is obvious and 
makes both the purpose and meaning of the regulation understandable: 
what is at stake is not a matter of quantities, but a matter of the quality of 
control
 the buyer will exercise through the intermediate enterprise in the 
company to be acquired. Which, furthermore, explains the second rule 
mentioned above. The rule of the A.C.I., apparently and explicitly, broke 
the links of enterprises by taking exclusively one intermediate enterprise into 
consideration. If further enterprises, even one-person enterprises, interpolate, 
they shall be ignored, therefore indirect ownership of shares shall not be 
taken into consideration from the viewpoint of the 33 p.c. limit.  
 With respect to the above, the case of Borsodchem Co. Ltd., is worth 
paying attention. As it is publicly known, Borsodchem Co. Ltd., is a public 
company with quoted shares, and a proportion of its shares was acquired by 
Russian and Austrian companies at the end of the year 2000. The Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Board (hereinafter referred to as Supervisory Board), 
allegedly upon the incentive of the company, however, quite justifiably, 
conducted investigation with the intention to reveal if any of the share-
holders had exceeded the 33 p.c. limit. If that had been the case, a public 
offer should have been made with special respect to Para. (3) of Art. 94/H 
of A.S., which states expressis verbis, that any agreement on transfer of 
shares shall be nullified in the event of violation of rules concerning the 
public offer transaction. 
 The investigation revealed that Russian and Austrian companies, 
which acquired the shares, hadn’t exceeded the legal limit, and the context 
was irrelevant to the case of the indirect transfer of shares prescribed in 
A.S. or A.C.I.. As a matter of fact, Appendix 4 of A.C.I., referred to above, 
apparently stipulates that the concerted acquisition of shares by distinct 
parties otherwise unrelated, or if the organisational alliance between them 
doesn’t present a case defined under A.S. and A.C.I., shall not qualify as 
indirect transfer of shares. The Supervisory Board stated explicitly that, 
although, substantive legal offence hadn’t been perpetrated in the trans-
action of the acquisition of Borsodchem Co. Ltd., shares, the transaction 
violated the spirit of the law, which (would have) served as a basis for 
intervention. No argument is necessary for the indefensibility and unlaw-
fulness of the statement above, which reminds me of an age-long doctrine 
recognised by every citizen in democratic states constituted on the rule of 
law, that exclusively the presentation of a legal case may incur sanctions 
in the event of statutory interdiction.  
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 An interpretation propter legem wouldn’t offer solutions, whereas the 
amendment of the statute on the basis of the constitution, finally realised 
under Act L of 2001, certainly could. Nevertheless, the consequences of 
the effective law and the way it affects public companies raise further 
concerns.  
  
5. According to Para. (2) of Art. 94/B of A.S., at the request of the offeror 
and preceding the announcement of the offer, the board of company 
directors shall provide the necessary information on the operation of the 
company as a basis for definition of the terms of the offer. In practice, this 
provision led to serious problems and the collision of interests, because, 
on the one hand, the offeror obviously demands sufficient information for 
the elaboration of the offer, on the other hand, the boundary between the 
information reasonably demanded and the trade secrets of the company 
was ambiguous. In other words, the regulation does not make a clear-cut 
distinction between the data to be provided and the data that shall be or 
must be exempt from this obligation. Underlying the issue is the dilemma 
that no publicly accessible data needs to be requested from the company, 
and again, publicly inaccessible data, i.e. trade secrets, cannot be de-
manded until the offeror has acquired holding in the company, since the 
potentiality that the offeror is a competitor, cannot be ignored. The 
dilemma has remained unsolved both by the secrecy agreement applied in 
such case and the rule of Para. (3) of Art. 94/B of A.S., according to 
which the data obtained shall be treated and used according to regulations 
concerning trade and securities secrets. Neither could Para. (2) of Art. 94/A 
of A.S. supply remedies by obliging the buyer to publicise its conceptions 
on corporate policy and the future operation of the company to be acquired, 
or, if the buyer was an economic organisation, to compile an information 
brochure on its former business activities. 
 An array of problems emerged concerning the application of the provision 
above. On the one hand, A.S. didn’t specify the stage the offeror had to 
publicise the information at. According to the legal context, publication was 
due at the time of making the public offer, consequently after the information 
had been obtained from the company to be acquired. Which logically follows, 
since the elaboration of corporate policy on the part of the offeror is 
unfeasible without sufficient information. On the other hand, and obviously 
inconsistently with the law-maker’s underlying purpose, the term of “business 
association” was once again introduced, which, in the Companies Act, had 
already proved inapplicable to foreign companies, which were not definable 
as business associations according to Hungarian law.  
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 No argument can be made for the requirement of the provision of infor-
mation on the company to be taken over or for the motives of the regulation 
except that the public operation of the company confers both rights and 
obligations. While the take-over regulations above have been formulated to 
protect the shareholders’ rights, confidential data of the company thereby 
could become public. In such cases the risk lies in the fact that, upon the 
assertion of the purported take-over, the competitor may request the board 
for and get access to data, whereas that competitor is later entitled to 
decline to make an offer without consequences. The rule of A.S. of 1997 
did not supply remedy for the problem. 
 
6. The text of the law left no doubts about the transaction of the offer. It 
had to be made for all shareholders and bondholders, and all the offerees 
had equal rights to decide whether to accept or turn down the offer (Paras. 
(3) and (4), Art. 94 of A.S. of 1997). The content and the elements covered 
by the offer were meticulously defined under Para. (1) of Art. 94/A of 
A.S. The quotation of the offer price regulated under Points a) and b) of Art. 5 
of A.S. is crucial in case the respective share is not registered. According 
to the rules concerning the transaction, the offeror shall simultaneously 
notify both the Supervisory Board and the board of directors (Para.1. of Art. 
94/B. of A.S.) about the offer. The authority of the board of directors was 
restricted for a period between 30 and 60 days provided for the acceptance 
of the public offer, since it was not entitled to make any decisions that 
could interfere with the transaction. The A.S. included two modelling 
cases: even if the board of directors is entitled to, it shall not decide to 
increase the registered capital or to acquire company shares. Of course, 
the ban applies to the shareholders, therefore rights related to the ordinary 
meeting were not affected.   
 
7. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Board was given an extended 
field of authority over public offering and the transaction of the take-over. 
As mentioned above, the offer was reported by sending the material to the 
Supervisory Board. Under Para. (1) of Art. 94/C of A.S., the Supervisory 
Board was entitled to prohibit the acquisition of shares and notify the 
board of directors accordingly within 15 days of receipt of the report, if 
the offer didn’t comply with legal requirements. If the Supervisory Board, 
however, didn’t make a statement within the specified period of 15 days, 
that incurred acknowledgement of the report. 
 A further authority of the Supervisory Board was that if the offer 
concerned unregistered shares, the equivalent of which was not quotable 
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under Point b) of Para. (5) of Art. 94/A,11 the Supervisory Board was 
entitled to quote the equivalent of the shares within the 15-day-period 
granted for the supervision of the report.  
 Finally, the question concerning the relationship between the take-over 
rules exposed above and antitrust law is still unanswered, since the A.S. 
didn’t provide explicit rules on the relationship. The still effective Para. 
(2) of Art. 295 of Companies Act provides minority shareholders may 
offer their shares for purchase to the acquirer of majority holding or direct 
controlling interest, however, the rule shall not apply if the majority 
holding or direct controlling interest is acquired through a take-over as 
specified in A.S. The exemption is relevant exclusively under Para. (1) of 
Art. 295 of Companies Act, other antitrust law regulations shall certainly 
apply. Therefore, if the offeror has acquired a proportion of shares in 
excess of 50 p.c. as a consequence of a public offer, i.e. has acquired 
majority holding under the Companies Act, relevant antitrust regulations 
shall be applied after completion of the take-over procedure, such as, 
Para. (3) of Art. 295, under which the specified limit of 10 p.c. to 5 p.c. 
for minority shareholders was decreased, or Para. (1) of Art. 296 on 
creditors’ rights. 
 Parallelly, if the offeror acquired a share in excess of 50 p.c. or 75 p.c. 
in a public offer transaction, the provision of Para. (1) of Art. 295 of 
Companies Act was ignored. The exemption concerned exclusively that 
particular provision of the Companies Act, other antitrust regulations were 
applied. Therefore, under the provisions of the Companies Act, if the 
offeror had acquired 65 p.c. of the company shares before a further acqui-
sition of 11 p.c., then, as explained above, the public offer transaction was 
unnecessary upon the acquisition of 11 p.c., whereas the increase in 
acquisitions from majority holding to direct controlling interest had to be 
disclosed. In that case, the status of minority shareholders was specified 
under Para. (1) of Art. 295, and creditors’ rights were provided under 
Paras. (2) and (3) of Art. 296 of Companies Act. 
 
 

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 According to the provision, the offer price in case of unregistered shares shall 
not be under the average price quoted by the stock exchange for a period of 180 days 
preceding the date of the public offer.  
 TAKE-OVER LEGISLATION IN HUNGARY 103 
  
II. Take-over Regulation under Act L of 2001 
 
1. As an outcome of the Borsodchem Co. Ltd., case, both the financial 
circles and the press called for the urgent and overall revision of securities 
law. Before actual legislative work started in 2001, the prospect of the 
establishment of a so-called unified Act on Capital Markets including the 
fields of securities law, stock and commodity exchange, investment funds, 
and the comparatively small, nevertheless significant field of take-over 
rules, had already been discussed for a long time. The significance of the 
latter had been apparently demonstrated by the amendment of take-over 
regulations in line with tax regulations, fee and other financial rules under 
A.S., even before the new Act on Capital Markets was drafted. As a 
consequence of the amendments, Chapter XIV/A. of A.S. ceased to have 
effect and was replaced by new provisions, i.e. Arts. 94–94/O. Specific 
provisions defining the sphere of authority of the Supervisory Board were 
also amended with respect to the new law.12 Simultaneously, certain 
regulations of the Companies Act concerning public companies were 
modified in view of the objective of harmonising the Companies Act with 
the new law.13 
 I need to remark finally, that while this paper is written, the draft of 
Act on Capital Markets has already been introduced to the parliament, as 
the outcome of an endeavour to broadly and meticulously regulate the 
entire fields of securities law, commodity exchange and investment funds 
under a single act.14 The rules are embodied in a highly detailed Code of 
435 Sections, while the Third Chapter (Arts. 65–80), substantively in-
corporates the rules of Act L. of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as A.S. of 
2001), which regulate the field of take-over, that is, according to the text 
of the law, the acquisition of shares in a public company.  
 
2. A major change was introduced as far as legal terminology is concerned. 
While A.S. of 1997 discussed the take-over of a company, A.S. of 2001 
covered acquisition of control. Before dealing with the crucial and far-
reaching substantive demarcation, I have to point out that the acquisition 
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 See, i) of Art. 123; Para. (5) of Art. 128; Para. (3) of Art. 133; Para. (1) h) of Art. 
136; Points a) and f) of Para. (3) of Art. 136; Para. (2) a) f) and l) of Art. 137; Para. (3) of 
Art. 137; Para. (1) of Art. 142; Para. (2) of Art. 143 of A.S. of 2001. 
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 See, Para. (6) of Art. 51; Para. (3) of Art. 229; Para. (4) of Art. 295 of Companies 
Act. 
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 Completion date of the present paper is 10th November, 2001.  
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of control
 meant to be regulated by A.S. of 2001 has other reference basis 
than the acquisition of control in Chapter XVI. of the new Companies 
Act. Unprecedented rules have been introduced into Hungarian law by 
A.S. of 2001, which extends the scope of regulation in an extraordinarily 
broad manner. The application of the term of take-over would not be 
proper with respect to the law-maker’s intention, because there is more at 
stake, however, antitrust law had already “reserved” and institutionalised 
the term of acquisition of control. Therefore, the “not perfectly in place” 
terminology of A.S. of 2001 is slightly bewildering. 
 
3. The differences from A.S. are obviously intentional and conceal serious, 
substantive incongruities. According to the definition of Para. (1) of Art. 
94 of A.S. of 2001, the term of “acquisition of control” covers the acquisition 
of holding or voting rights guaranteeing participation in decision-making 
at the shareholder’s assembly of the company. That covers both the enforce-
ment of purchase and redemption rights, or of a dated purchase agreement 
related to voting shares, and the exercise of voting rights on the basis of 
using or beneficial rights. The same conditions apply, in case the control 
hasn’t been acquired owing to directly coherent behaviour, but owing to other 
circumstances, i.e. inheritance, legal succession or the decision of the share-
holders’ general assembly, which modifies either the proportional number 
of votes concerning voting rights or the reinstatement of voting rights.   
 According to Para. (2), acquisition of control covers any agreement 
between the shareholders, pursuant to which, on the one hand a shareholder 
is granted electing or recalling rights concerning the majority of the members 
of the board of directors or supervision, on the other hand the parties under-
take unified control of the company.  
 Rules of Paras. (1) and (2), are amended under Para. (3), which states 
that upon the assessment of the case and the rate of the acquisition of 
control, both direct and indirect acquisitions and these of next of kin shall 
be considered and added up. According to Para. (4), acquisition of control 
shall be established if it isn’t the outcome of a transaction by related 
parties as specified under Para. (3), but the consequence of the concerted 
action of unrelated parties.  
 Para. (5) broadens the scope further, and provides, in compliance with 
preceding sections, that the exercise of a shareholder’s right on behalf 
of a third party is considered a voting right. According to Para. (6), non-
resident third parties are exempted from the effect of the rule above, if 
they register not as a shareholder’s proxy, but as a shareholder (residents 
are not covered by the exemption) into the stockholders’ register.  
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 The law-makers’ intention is apparent in view of the meticulous definition, 
besides acquisition through transfer of shares, other share acquisition cases 
also have to be regulated and controlled in case of public companies. An 
even more fundamental step is the extension of the regulation to cases that 
don’t concern devolution of the ownership of shares, but an agreement 
between shareholders on the management of the company. That endeavour 
is not peculiar to Hungary, almost all European countries with that kind of 
regulation, including the EU regulation attempt, have dealt with the concept.15 
 The logical consequence of bringing the above case under the effect of 
the law is that several statutes had to be incorporated into the law, so that 
it was capable of regulating the case that was obviously more complex than 
a “mere” acquisition of control by purchase of shares. As an example, 
without asserting a claim for completeness, I refer to Para. (3) of Art. 94/C 
providing that a public offer is mandatory for all parties to the share-
holders’ agreement, unless the parties consent to appointing a party. Therefore, 
the party denouncing the right to appoint a member of the board of directors 
or supervisors for the benefit of another shareholder, ad absurdum, shall 
have to make a public offer. Besides, the agreement on the person of the 
public offeror, shall not exempt other parties concerned from the respon-
sibilities related to public offer.  
 
4. Para. (3) of Art. 94 of A.S. of 2001 concerns not only direct but indirect 
acquisition of control. Beyond formal congruence with preceding rules, a 
major difference has been established concerning the scope of reference of 
the term “indirect interest”. 
 Under point 36 of Para. (2) of Art. 3 of A.S. of 2001, rendering definitions, 
the scope of indirect holding or control has been remarkably extended. 
Reference to the A.C.I. was avoided, a definitely beneficial decision with 
respect to editing, therefore two rules regarding the case above have expired. 
One of these rules provided that the share of holding below 25 p.c. is 
ignored or not taken into consideration in case the owner holds a share in 
the intermediate enterprise through more than one enterprise. However, 
A.S. of 2001 states that assessment of the rate of indirect holding and 
indirect interest of the acquirer shall be made by multiplying the higher rate 
of voting or holding rights of the acquirer in the intermediate enterprise by 
higher the rate of voting or holding rights of the intermediate enterprise in 
the respective company. In case the rate of voting or holding rights in the 

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 See, e.g. Clause 1 of Chapter 5 of the draft of EU Directive 13, withdrawn. 
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intermediate company is in excess of 50 p.c., it shall be considered as a 
whole ownership. 
 As a consequence of the omission of the rules under Appendix 4 of A.C.I., 
the issue of how many links of interest in intermediate companies should 
be taken into consideration remains ambiguous under A.S. of 2001. Although, 
the currently standard interpretation of taking one link into consideration 
can be inferred from the definition, the omission of the preceding rule 
confers a message, which might be directive in interpretation. Rejection of the 
rule of consideration of “one link” results ultimately in the requirement of 
considering several links of interest, which poses the problem of where to 
set a limit. The law evades the definition therefore further problems will 
arise. A likely interpretation of the reference to a share over 50 p.c. is that 
such a share of holding or voting rights shall be considered not indirect 
but direct interest, which suggests the likely interpretation again, that all 
links of indirect interest shall be considered. 
 A further issue is the regulation of the share of voting and holding 
rights
 stipulating that the larger proportion should be considered. Disregarding 
the fact that the intermediate company may take any organisational form, 
provided that a party has no or a different share of voting rights from that 
of holding rights in the respective enterprise, that party may participate in 
decision-making with the voting rights, not with the holding rights. 
Possession of holding rights but no voting rights does not grant the right 
to participate in decision-making. The rationale underlying that particular 
regulation of A.S. of 2001 can be challenged, which the law itself also 
seems recognise when it provides a further rule. The requirement of making 
a public offer under Para. (2) of Art. 94/C is subject to the acquisition of a 
25 p.c. share, in contrast with the main standard. Reasonably, the regulation 
in that case provides exclusively for voting rights and does not refer to the 
share of holding rights. 
  
5. A further, very essential change is the assertion of the standard share 
from the viewpoint of take-over or acquisition of control. With respect to 
the above, the only determining standard specified by previous rules was 
the 33 p.c. limit. A.S. didn’t construe these as subject to the issue of take-
over and provided no rules concerning acquisitions under the 33 p.c. limit. 
The regulatory concept underlying A.S. of 2001, as relevant from the 
above, is fundamentally different. Art. 94/B. of A.S. of 2001 provides that an 
acquisition of control up to a share of 5 p.c., then every further acquisition 
of a share of 5 p.c. shall be reported both to the Supervisory Board and the 
board of directors of the respective company within two calendar days 
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following the date of acquisition. Similar reporting obligations pertain to the 
decrease
 of interest of an equivalent rate. Para. 9 of Art. 94/B. allows for the 
memorandum of the company to extend the reporting and disclosure 
obligation to “an increase or decrease of interest at a rate of 2 p.c.” That 
rule, apart from the fact that the assertion of an acquisition of control at a 
rate of 2 p.c. is rather peculiar, does not specify whether the reporting 
liability is applicable to each case of increase or decrease in acquisition at 
a rate of 2 p.c. or it concerns the lowest limit, exclusively. The latter 
supposition is justified by the text, the former is supported by the context, 
and more likely. According to my knowledge, this rule concerning the 
rates of both 5 per cent and 2 per cent is unique with respect to the 
European Union regulations, none of which supplies us with precedence 
of such rigour.  
 The introduction of the five-per-cent rule incurred crucial changes in 
the structure of the regulation. The acquisition of a share of 5 p.c. shall 
not imply the requirement of making a public offer, which is still confined 
to an acquisition of a share in excess of 33 p.c. under the normative rule 
of Para. (1) of Art. 94/C.16 However, each time an acquisition of a share of 
5 p.c. is made under the limit of 33 p.c. reporting shall be mandatory 
within an extremely rigorous and short period, the neglect of which, like 
all offences, is sanctioned by a fine imposed by the Supervisory Board 
according to Point (m) of Para. (2) of new Art. 143 of A.S. of 2001. The 
value of the fine is fixed between the broad limits of amounts of 500 
thousand and 100 million HUF. Since rules concerning fines have not 
changed in other respects, according to Para. (1) of Art. 143, the conditions 
and basis of imposition of the fine are subject to the discretion of the 
Supervisory Board. A further and ultimate sanction of the neglect of 
reporting liability, not subject to discretion, is the withdrawal of the exercise 
of membership rights in the company until compliance with the reporting 
liability.  
 The most fundamental change incurred by the new regulation is that 
the former focus on making a public offer pursuant to an intention of acquisition 
of 33 p.c. has shifted to the requirement of the practically incessant provision 
of information
 to the Supervisory Board, since the reporting liability 
pertains to a relatively minor change in the status of shares of public 
companies and is extended to shareholders’ agreements. According to the 
rule of Para. (6) of Art. 94/B., the reporting liability pertains upon the 

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acquisition of a rate of 50 p.c. control, whereas the disclosure liability is 
pursuant to the event of reaching the limits of 75 p.c. or 90 p.c. control. 
Which, on the one hand, provides evidence that the reporting liability in 
each event of the increase of control by 5 p.c. shall be construed separately 
from the requirement of making a public offer in the event of exceeding the 
33 p.c. limit. On the other hand, the rule above severed another link with 
the Companies Act, in the framework of which an acquisition of control of 
75 p.c. is construed as the upper limit with respect to antitrust law. 
Furthermore, Para. 8 of Art. 94/B., which bans the exercise of membership 
rights in the event of delay is applicable exclusively to the reporting 
liability, shall not concern the neglect of the disclosure liability, which, 
again, exemplifies that the law-maker attached great and exclusive 
importance to the provision of information to the Supervisory Board.  
 Nothing is more revealing as to the rigour of the regulation than Para. 7 of 
Art. 94/B, which extends reporting and disclosure liabilities to agreements 
between shareholders that project the acquisition of control at a later 
date. The text of the regulation explicitly asserts that reporting and 
disclosure liabilities pertain to any, indefinitely postponed, foreseeable 
acquisition under specific conditions. As for deadlines, the date of the 
agreement shall be authoritative, and reporting liability shall be complied 
with within two calendar days of conclusion of the agreement disregarding 
holidays and disclosure shall also be initiated.  
 Para. (4) of Art. 94/B of A.S. 2001 specifies what the report shall 
state. Accordingly, the name(s) of the acquirer or of the parties to the 
agreement, data on the location of the headquarters, the company registry 
code, the rate of control and definition of the relationship as specified in 
Para. (2) of Art. 94 shall be stated. Simultaneously, the acquirer or each 
party to the agreement shall proceed to disclose the report, implying that 
besides the Supervisory Board, the public shall also be notified about, 
formerly confidential, agreements between shareholders of the company. 
Concerning the media of disclosure, Art. 94/A provides that agreements 
shall be announced in the company and stock exchange journals and on 
web-sites.  
 
6. The transaction of public offer is regulated under Art. 94/C and the 
subsequent articles. The primary change concerns rates, since, whereas the 
limit of 33 p.c. remains normative, making a public offer for the acquisition 
of control in excess of 25 p.c. shall be mandatory, if no other party 
possesses voting rights, directly or indirectly, in excess of 10 p.c., except 
for the party intending to acquire control in the company.  
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 It is to be regretted that the text is inaccurate, again, concerning the case 
when the party, who intends to acquire control, does not possess voting 
rights in excess of 10 p.c. either (for the time being). The text presumably 
implies that in that specific case the 25 p.c. limit is ultimately disregarded 
with respect to the acquirer, with or without a share of 10 p.c.. However, 
that should have been unambiguously and literally formulated in the text. 
 The new rule of Para. (2) of Art. 94/C follows from the extension of 
the term of acquisition of control. In the standard case, when the acquirer 
intends to buy a certain amount of shares, a public offer shall be made 
upon the permission of the Supervisory Board under Para. (1). Notwith-
standing, under Para. (1) and further paras. of Art. 94, several other types 
of buyer behaviour and cases are specified as acquisition of control, Para. 
(2) of Art. 94/C, with reference to these cases, provides that the fact of 
acquisition of control completed in an according manner shall be reported, 
disclosed, and at the same time, the public offer shall be made within 15 
days following the date of reporting the acquisition. This rule applies to 
cases when acquisition of control is not the consequence of the acquirer’s 
directly coherent behaviour, but results from the enforcement of purchase 
or redemption rights, or the completion of a dated agreement. The same 
rules apply to acquisition according to a shareholders’ agreement or an 
investigation conducted by the state receiver syndicate.  
 According to A.S. of 1997, besides voting shares, convertible bonds, if 
any, issued by the company shall be subject to a public offer transaction. 
On the other hand, according to the regulation of 1997, the offer shall 
concern a minimum of 50 p.c. of the shares. However, A.S. of 2001 has made 
amendments to both of the above rules. On the one hand, it does not cover 
bonds, the text, emphatically and consistently, refers to shares, therefore, 
convertible bonds shall be disregarded from that aspect. On the other 
hand, under Para. (1) of Art. 94/F, public offers shall not be confined to a 
proportion of 50 p.c. of voting shares, however, they shall be made to 
cover all voting shares and all holders of voting rights. Which, in view of 
the above, implies the potential that a share acquisition above the 25 p.c. 
limit isn’t feasible unless the acquirer purchases 100 p.c. of the shares, 
since the offer must concern the whole amount of shares. 
 As a matter of fact, according to a more professional and accurate 
rendition, Para. (2) of Art. 94/K of A.S. of 2001 has incorporated the 
provision of Para. (5) of Art. 94/H of A.S. of 1997. Accordingly, on condition 
that the offeror has acquired more than 90 p.c. of the company shares as a 
consequence of a public offer transaction and fully complied with the 
liability of payment of the equivalent, the offeror shall be legally due 
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purchase rights
 for the shares not yet acquired within thirty days following 
the date of reporting to the Supervisory Board. In such cases, furthermore, 
for the benefit of other shareholders, a purchase liability applies under 
Para. (5) of Art. 94/K of A.S. of 2001, since at the request of the holders 
of the rest of the shares, it is the acquirer’s obligation to buy their shares, 
basically in accordance with the provision of Para. (1) of Art. 295 of 
Companies Act.  
 
7. Before entering upon an exposition of the detailed rules of the public 
offer transaction, I have to refer to the fact that A.S. of 2001 imposes 
different sanctions in the event of a share acquisition, which violates the 
rules of the public offer. As expounded above, A.S. of 1997 nullified such 
transfers of shares, which was ignored by the amendment of 2001. According 
to the recent Art. of 94/L of A.S. of 2001, if the acquisition of shares was 
implemented in a manner different from that specified by the rules of the 
public offer, membership rights in the company shall not be exercised. 
The acquirer shall be liable to alienate voting shares in excess of a rate of 
33 p.c. or 25 p.c., respectively, within 60 days. Membership rights unrelated 
to shares subject to the alienation liability shall be exercised exclusively 
after compliance with that liability. As a matter of fact, denouncing the 
radical nullity sanction on the part of the law-maker is remarkable, however, 
what may have accounted for that specific amendment were presumably 
practical reasons and, as an underlying consideration, incongruity with the 
effective rules of transfer of shares. According to the new settlement, 
transfer of ownership of shares implemented in compliance with relevant 
and effective rules shall be construed as valid, whereas the acquirer that 
violates these rules shall be subject to sanctions and face the risk of 
alienation liability.  
 
8. Effective rules of a public offer transaction differ from preceding A.S. 
regulations since they are more specific and provide for issues not covered 
by the rule of A.S. of 1997. What is of major practical importance, however, 
poorly constituted in the preceding regulation, is the accurate specifi-
cation of the binding substantive elements of the offer under Para. (2) of 
Art. 94/D. A significant aspect of the new regulation is that besides its 
provision for the requirement that the offeror submits a public statement 
on the conceptions concerning company policy,17 under Para. (4) of Art. 
94/D of A.S. of 2001 there is a reference to Appendix 8, which specifies 

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the aspects the operation plan to be submitted should cover, i.e., the 
content and the media of publication, which had not been regulated under 
Para. (2) of Art. 94/A of A.S of 1997. Inter alia, the plan should include 
details on the foreseeable effects of the acquisition on the employees, and 
if the offeror wishes to alter the profile of the company significantly, an 
explanation on the objectives and reasons underlying the decision shall 
also be given. 
 The rules concerning the report on the economic activity of the acquirer, 
which was not provided for under A.S. of 1997, are more relevant to my 
argument. The new regulation settles the terminology problem of “business 
association” by highlighting that related rules include foreign companies. 
On the other hand, this section of Appendix 8, tellingly, is a lot more 
specific than the provision on the operation plan, which, again, supports 
the view that information on the acquirer is of primary importance from 
the point of view of the Supervisory Board and the government. Let me 
refer to the requirement of submission of a report on the acquirer’s company 
history, on leading officials and the members of the supervisory board, on 
all agreements, whatever, between the acquirer, including controlling 
parties in the acquirer, and the company, on the one hand, or, provided 
that they might affect the public offer, leading officials of the company, 
on the other hand.  
 Concerning the requirement of appointing an external expert for the 
transaction of the public offer, there is no modification with respect to 
preceding rules. According to A.S. of 1997, the external expert could be 
an investment company, whereas A.S. of 2001 extends the scope by specifying 
that party as a distributor that, under Para. (5) of Art. 94/D, shall take 
responsibility, jointly with the offeror, for the truth value of the report on 
the offeror’s economic activity, which obviously complicates the 
distributor’s situation. Which, also, may appear as a major snag in case of 
less familiar foreign investors, since both the distributor and the offeror 
shall be held liable for damages incurred by the submission of a 
misguiding report or the concealment of information. Another issue is, of 
course, who is damaged and in what way, since the liability of attestation 
of damages lies with the injured party under Hungarian law, and a further 
ambiguous point is what the term of the injured party covers. 
 The regulation specifies the appendices to be attached to the request for 
the approval of the offer under Para. (6) of Art. 94/D, which shall justify the 
offeror’s possession of the equivalent of the shares subject to the offer (funds, 
state bonds issued either in Hungary or an OECD member state, a bank 
guarantee issued by a credit institution based in Hungary or an OECD state). 
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A statement on an agreement on the offeror’s person shall also be submitted, 
if the acquisition of control is transacted upon a shareholder’s agreement and 
the offer is not made jointly by the parties to the agreement. Furthermore, 
purchase and repurchase agreements shall also be included in the appendices 
provided that the acquisition of control is made with reference to these. 
 The new regulation specifies a peculiar arrangement on the information to 
be provided for the offeror by the company. As pointed out above, the 
regulation of 1997 (Para. (2) of Art. 94/B), obliged the company to provide 
information, and compliance with the requirement was not exempt from 
problems considering the respective circumstances. The new regulation 
does not contain such a requirement, Para. (1) of Art. 94/H stipulates that 
in the event of provision of information by the board of company directors 
at the request of the offeror, the acquired data shall be treated according 
to the rules pertaining to the confidentiality of bills and notes on the one 
hand, and the prohibition on insider dealing, which is a new element, on 
the other hand. Accordingly, the provision and the quality of information 
shall be made dependent on the decision and the discretion of the board of 
directors. The significance of these changes can hardly be estimated in the 
first approach. On the one hand, they manage to ward off the apparent 
danger of release of trade secrets to a potential competitor, on the other 
hand, they can be assessed to model a legal policy, which expresses the 
intention to reinforce and benefit the existing structure of companies and 
demonstrates its non-preference for new investments. 
 However, Para. (3) of Art. 94/H stipulates that the board of directors 
shall respond actively by giving an opinion on the offer and publicise it at 
the same place where the offeror’s operation plan and report on its economic 
activity are displayed for inspection by the shareholders. The recent Appendix 
9 of the law specifies the aspects according to which expert opinion shall 
be given. The opinion shall contain a statement on the support or objection of 
the board of directors concerning the offer, and include any member’s 
dissent with an explanation. The board of directors has legal entitlement 
to employ, at its own cost, an independent financial expert for the 
assessment of the offer. In that case the expert opinion shall be publicised 
and made available for the shareholders in compliance with the above.    
  
9. As for the specific rules of a public offer transaction, the following 
points will be accentuated:  
 Under Paras. (1) and (2) of Art. 94/E, no changes have been made to 
expiry dates, the Supervisory Board shall make a decision within 15 days of 
the date of submission of the offer. In case the board does not respond, the 
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offer shall be considered approved. This rule has been amended by the 
provision of a peremptory term of 5 days by the Supervisory Board, on 
condition that the request is incomplete, therefore, subsequently completed 
requests shall be processed within 5 days. 
 Under Para. (5) of Art. 94/E, the maximum period of the decision-
making procedure on the offer was reduced from 60 days to 45 days.  
 As a logical consequence, Para. (7) of Art. 94/E includes a new provision, 
according to which neither the offeror, nor the parties to the share acquisition 
agreement or the business association, in which the parties above hold a 
share in excess of 25 p.c., shall transact transfer, alienation or debit of 
shares subject to the public offer in the approval period. Neither shall the 
distributor make a bill of sale concerning the respective shares during that 
period. In both cases, the transfer of shares subject to the offer are, of course, 
exempted. 
 
10. A binary amendment has been made to the way of setting the offer 
price. On the one hand, in contrast with the 90-day-period specified under 
the 1997 regulation, under Para. (1) of Art. 94/G of 2001 the average price 
of 180 days preceding the date of the offer shall be considered. This rule 
is, however, amended by the requirement of considering both the highest 
price stated in any agreement on the transfer of shares between the offeror 
and related parties during the above period, and the highest price and charge 
demanded in the agreement on purchase or repurchase. The offer price 
can’t fall short of the highest price listed above. In case the equivalent of 
the shares can’t be set according to the rules specified by the law, Para. 
(2) of Art. 94/G provides that the offered equivalent can’t fall short of the 
price formed according to the calculation method specified in the offer 
and approved by the Supervisory Board.  
 
11. The preceding regulation failed to answer several questions concerning 
the transaction of the transfer of shares. According to Art. 94/I of A.S. of 
2001, the statement concerning the acceptance of the offer shall not be 
withdrawn, furthermore, the offeror shall purchase all the shares covered 
by the accepted offer, unless offeror would acquire control that does not 
exceed 50 p.c., in the event of which the right to resist included in the 
offer applied. The agreement on the transfer of shares shall be uniformly 
concluded on the last day of the acceptance period, unless the offeror has 
arranged for a competition supervision procedure. In the event of which, 
under Para. (1) of Art. 94/D, the disclosure of the offer submitted to the 
Supervisory Board for approval shall include the details of the arrange-
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ment for a competition supervision procedure, as a consequence, the 
agreement on the transfer of shares shall be concluded on the date of 
permission following competition supervision under Para. (5) of Art. 94/I. 
 Concerning the payment of the equivalent, the regulation, quite reasonably, 
specifies extremely rigorous rules. On the one hand, payment of the 
equivalent shall be made within 5 working days of the date of conclusion of 
the agreement on the transfer of shares. On the other hand, in the event of 
delayed payment of over 30 days, besides stating a claim for interest on 
default payment, the offeree may cancel the agreement. According to a 
specific rule, the cancelling party shall report the cancellation to the 
Supervisory Board within two working days. The regulation does not 
specify the consequences the neglect of such reporting liability may incur, 
nor does it state compliance with reporting liability as a criterion of the 
effectiveness of cancellation. Nevertheless, Para. (8) of Art. 94/I provides 
that irrespective of cancellation or a claim for interest on default payment, 
the Supervisory Board may sanction the offence of rules concerning 
payment, which basically implies the imposition of a fine under Art. 141. 
The offeror, however, shall report compliance with the payment liability, 
or its failure and the underlying reasons, to the Supervisory Board within 
two calendar days after expiration of the payment period under Para. (1) 
of Art. 94/K. 
 
12. Finally, I cannot fail to mention that the new regulation also provides 
for the institution of counter-offer under Art. 94/J, with no changes to 
preceding rules. The period specified for the opportunity to make a counter-
offer has been shortened by 5 days. Since the new regulation stipulates that 
the offer shall cover all shares, the attractive aspect as a condition for the 
acceptance of the counter-offer is confined to the price. Nothing has 
changed in that respect, the price in the counter-offer is considered more 
attractive if the stated equivalent is at least 5 p.c. higher in HUF.  
 
13. Whereas the preceding rules didn’t foreclose voluntary offer as a 
potential, the new regulation explicitly institutionalises it under Art. 94/N, 
applicable under the above rules with specific and according exemptions. 
As such, the provision of Art. 94/F specifies as requirement that the offer 
shall cover all shares, while Art. 94/H provides a rule concerning the 
liability of the board of directors to give an opinion and employ an 
independent financial expert. Furthermore, the rules of counter-offer are 
inapplicable, since making a counter-offer is foreclosed in the event of a 
voluntary public offer.   
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14. As mentioned in the introduction of this part, Act L of 2001 amended 
the regulations of the Companies Act
 in several respects. The amendments 
are meant to harmonise with the regulations concerning acquisition of control 
and logically follow from the rules propounded above. Para. (3) incorporated 
into Art. 229 of Companies Act is of particular importance, since the rule 
of Para. (2) of Art. 229 had allowed that the memorandum of a public 
company defined the highest rate of voting rights exercised by a shareholder 
with respect to registered shares. According to the recently incorporated 
regulation, the specific stipulation of the memorandum shall lose its effect, if 
the acquirer purchases shares in excess of 50 p.c. through a public offer 
transaction. The rule of this act, however, according to Para. (6) of Art. 82 of 
Act L of 2001, shall not concern the effective memorandum regulations 
for the time being, in as much as the rule of Para. (3) shall not be applied 
until the last day of the fifth year following the the date of enactment of 
the international agreement on Hungarian accession to the EU.  
 According to Para. (4) of Art. 295, introduced as a new rule into the 
antitrust regulations of the Companies Act, in the event of acquisition of 
majority holdings or direct controlling interest in a public company, the 
value of the shares offered for purchase shall not fall short of the equivalent 
defined according to the rules concerning the acquisition of shares through a 
public offer transaction. In other words, with respect to a public company, 
the “market value” as specified under Para. (1) of Art. 295 is construed as 
effective according to the amendment of the new rule of Para. (4). 
 The amendment that annuls Para. (1) of Art. 292 of Companies Act is 
somewhat ambiguous. The text annulled specified the requirement of 
reporting both an acquisition of significant or majority holdings and of direct 
controlling interest, including a statement on “the form and rate of control”, to 
shares, and extend to limited liability companies, therefore, the the registry 
court. Antitrust regulations of the Companies Act concerning the controlled 
company cover both public and private companies limited by underlying 
reasons for the annulment of the requirement of “inclusion of a statement on 
the form and rate of control” as a consequence of the amendments to financial 
law are not clear. Since the law specifies registration as mandatory, regulation 
of the contents of the registration statement would only be proper.   
 In other respects, the regulations of the Companies Act haven’t been 
revised, therefore, the antitrust provisions shall apply according to the 
rules of A.S. of 1997.  
 
15. Effect. After the exposition of the recent regulations above, I will finally 
discuss the issue of the effect of the new provisions, which, according to my 
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viewpoint raises grave concerns in view of constitutionality, when they 
implicitly mean to introduce the statute with retroactive effect. The starting 
point is clear and right, in as much as the amended regulations of A.S., 
according to Art. 82 of the closing provisions of Act L of 2001, are applicable 
to acquisition of control following 18th July, 2001, i.e. following enforcement 
of the law. If transactions of take-over of a company had commenced before 
the law took effect, they shall be conducted according to preceding rules.  
 However, Para. (2) of Art. 82 states that if, before its entry into force, 
liabilities of reporting, disclosure or public offer as specified by A.S. of 
2001 had not been established by effective law, the obligor shall be liable 
to report and disclose the form and rate of its existing control, according 
to the new rule, within 60 days of the date of enforcement of the law, 
practically by mid-September of 2001. A detailed explanation is presumably 
not necessary to point out that here a subsequently issued statute defines 
the existing control as acquisition of control, which, consequently, binds the 
shareholder to procedures (reporting and disclosure), which were legally 
not provided for at the time of the acquisition.     
 Furthermore, I need to refer to Para. (3) of Art. 82, which stipulates 
that if the holder had acquired shares in excess of 25 p.c. or 33 p.c. before 
Para. (3) took effect, and in compliance with preceding law hadn’t made a 
public offer, then the rate of that control can be increased exclusively under 
effective rules of public offer transaction. The provision above is problematic 
from a further aspect. If the acquisition of control was not subject to a 
public offer transaction, which may have motivated the acquisition of shares 
under specific circumstances, and the acquirer could expect to increase 
that stake under effective rules at the time of the acquisition, then the new 
regulation, with retroactive effect, ultimately prohibits the transaction 
formerly legal and specifies rules that the acquirer could not take into 
consideration.   
 Para. (4) of Art. 82 stipulates a requirement that after its enforcement public 
companies amend their memoranda at their first ordinary meeting, i.e. at the 
spring annual meeting of 2002 at the latest, unless their memoranda regulations 
are in compliance with the new rules. The provision exempts memorandum 
regulations concerning the limit of the offer and the calculation of the 
minimum amount of offer price, which shall be harmonised with effective law 
by 30th June of 2004. A further exemption concerns the later application of 
the recent Para. (3) of Art. 229 of Companies Act expounded above.  
 
16. Conclusion. The assessment of a recently enforced statute is by no means 
a simple, however, a rather risky undertaking, since the primary standard 
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of assessment is the application capable of evaluating positive and negative 
effects of the law. The evaluation is further complicated by the fact that 
professional (economic, financial) arguments are considerably intertwined 
with political concerns. However, I can hardly evade posing the question. 
 It is a mere fact that both the European Union and the member states 
are making remarkable efforts to settle the issue of take-over regulation. 
The real dilemma is obviously constituted by the problem of locating the 
ruling boundary the regulative transgression of which would incur disturbance 
in the operation of major registered companies with significant share in 
the economy of the respective country, and thereby, regulation is construed as 
more damaging than yielding. In this respect, the case of Hungarian law is 
peculiar in the sense that the recent one and a half or two years of the 
Budapest Stock Exchange would justify loosening stiff rules, instead of 
setting new barriers. What is seen as a problem is that both the intention and 
the meaning of the regulation of acquisition of control seem to have tarnished 
in the process of law-making, whereas rationality has been outstripped by 
an effort to comply with the pervasive and ominous standard of rigorous 
rules and “order”, although the majority of the rules established are not 
unfamiliar to European practice. There are, however, severe risks entrapped 
in the mechanical import of technical procedures, particularly in an area in 
the intersection of economy and law. The following years to come will 
either prove of disprove the concerns exposed above. 
 
